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[energeia, actus, Wirklichkeit] see also action, being, existence, possibility, postulates of empirical thought, principlesKant's use of the term actuality in the second postulate of empirical thought may be clarified by means of a comparison with the Aristotelian term energeia, which meant both action and actuality. The latter term usually referred to energeia in conjunction with dynamis, a term equivocally translated as either possibility or potentiality. Energeia meant the putting into action of dynamis, but without the requirement that dynamis be thought either ontologically or epistemologically prior to energeia. To make such a claim would entail subordinating both terms to the categorical determinations of being. This is unacceptable because energeia and dynamis are pre-categorical; indeed, for Aristotle they even give rise to the categories of quantity, quality, condition and location (Aristotle, 1941, 201a, 10). For this reason the relation between them cannot be stated categorically, but only analogically (see Aristotle, 1941, 1048a and 1065b).Even though Kant situates the principle of actuality categorically, in terms of the second modal category of existence/non-existence, it still bears many of the features of Aristotle's initial statement, but as overdetermined by the Christian tradition. Aristotle's argument for the eternity of matter and the world posed obvious difficulties ... log in or subscribe to read full text