Blackwell Reference Online

Extract

Except for alleged cases of things that are evident for one just by being true, it has often been thought, anything that is known must satisfy certain criteria as well as being true ( see criterion, canon ). These criteria are general principles specifying what sorts of considerations C will make a proposition p evident to us. Traditional suggestions include: (a) if a proposition p , e.g. that 2 + 2 = 4, is clearly and distinctly conceived, then p is evident (see descartes, hume ): or simply, (b) if we can't conceive p to be false, then p is evident: or (c) whatever we are immediately conscious of in thought or experience, e.g. that we seem to see red, is evident. These might be criteria whereby putative self-evident truths, e.g. that one clearly and distinctly conceives p , ‘transmit’ the status as evident they already have for one without criteria to other propositions like p. Alternatively, they might be criteria whereby epistemic status, e.g. p 's being evident, is ‘originally created’ by purely non-epistemic considerations, e.g. facts about how p is conceived which are neither self-evident nor already criterially evident. However it is ‘originally created’, presumably epistemic status, including degrees of warranted acceptance or probability, can be ‘transmitted’ deductively from premisses to conclusions. Criteria then must say when and to what degree, e.g., ... log in or subscribe to read full text