Blackwell Reference Online

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Except for alleged cases of self-evident truths, it is often thought that anything that is known must satisfy certain criteria or standards (Sextus Empiricus, 1933 ). These criteria are general principles specifying the sorts of considerations that will make a proposition evident or just make accepting it warranted to some degree. Common suggestions for this role include: if one clearly and distinctly conceives a proposition p , e.g. that 2 + 2 = 4, p is evident: or, if p coheres with the bulk of one's beliefs, p is warranted. These might be criteria whereby putative self-evident truths, e.g. that one clearly and distinctly conceives p , ‘transmit’ the status as evident they already have without criteria to other propositions like p , or they might be criteria whereby purely non-epistemic considerations, e.g. facts about logical connections or about conception that need not be already evident or warranted, originally ‘create’ p's epistemic status. If that in turn can be ‘transmitted’ to other propositions, e.g. by deduction or induction, there will be criteria specifying when it is. See also criteria and knowledge ; sextus empiricus . : Theory of Knowledge 3rd edn ( Englewood Cliffs : Prentice-Hall , 1989 ), 6–7. 61–74 . : ‘ Foundationalism, epistemic principles, and the Cartesian circle’ , Philosophical Review 88 ( 1979 ), 55 – 91 . : ‘ Non-inductive evidence: ... log in or subscribe to read full text