Blackwell Reference Online

Extract

Following Aristotle (1941, Bk VI, ch. 1), we may begin by distinguishing two broadly different sorts of ‘intellectual virtues’. There are those qualities of wisdom and good judgement which are conducive to a happy, or moral, or successful life. And there are those qualities of character which are conducive, we think, to the discovery of truth (and the avoidance of error). The latter correspond to the ‘epistemic virtues’ in contemporary epistemology. Such a teleological characterization of the epistemic virtues raises, however, a number of interesting problems. The progress of science, we would like to think, leads us not only closer to the truth, but to discover ever better means of accomplishing this end. But does this mean that we are becoming ever more epistemically virtuous – or is there a difference between the progress of knowledge and the improvement of epistemic character ? Relatedly, there is this sceptical problem. Suppose that the world were so vastly different from the way it is presently conceived that the very characteristics we take to be truth-conducive actually are leading us deeper and deeper into error; suppose, too, that certain seemingly very simple-minded attitudes and procedures are actually more truth-conducive than these other attitudes. Would the apparent ‘fool’ then be the epistemically virtuous inquirer? Or must we somehow relativize what counts ... log in or subscribe to read full text