Blackwell Reference Online

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Several public/private distinctions have been drawn in the philosophy of mind. One concerns public/private possession . Two people can have the same car; a car may be co-owned. Thus, cars can be publically possessed, possessed by more than one individual. It has been claimed, however, that experiences ( see experience ) are essentially private in that only the subject having the particular experience in question could have that very experience (see Ayer, 1959 ; Rorty, 1965 ; Searle, 1992 ; Unger, 1990 ). Thus, only I can have my pain experiences. One might concede this but deny that it reveals anything special about experiences. Suppose I take a walk. One might claim that while it is true in a sense that only I can have my experiences, it is also true in a sense that only I can take my walk. Of course, others can take a walk of the same type as mine. But, likewise, others can have an experience of the same type as mine. What others cannot have is my actual token of the type of experience in question. But, likewise, it seems that others cannot take my actual token walk. It might be argued that there is a sense in which another could have taken the very token walk I walk; but it may be argued as well that there is, similarly, a sense in which another could have had the very token experience I have. Perhaps it will seem more plausible that another could have taken my actual token ... log in or subscribe to read full text