Blackwell Reference Online

Extract

Acquaintance is a central notion in Russellian metaphysics, as well as Russellian epistemology and philosophy of language. Russell distinguishes knowledge by acquaintance from knowledge by description, and characterizes the former as follows. (1)  ‘We shall say we have acquaintance with anything of which we are directly aware, without the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths’ ( Russell, 1959 , p. 46, italics in original). (2)  ‘it is possible, without absurdity, to doubt whether there is a table at all, whereas it is not possible to doubt the sense-data’ ( Russell, 1959 , p. 47). The table is not an object of acquaintance, but the sense-data are, and this condition is supposed to provide a general contrast between objects of acquaintance and other things. (3)  ‘All our knowledge, both knowledge of things and knowledge of truths, rests upon acquaintance as its foundation’ ( Russell, 1959 , p. 48). (4) Russell also specifies objects of acquaintance by extension. 'We have acquaintance in sensation with the data of the outer senses, and in introspection with the data of what may be called the inner sense – thoughts, feeling, desires, etc.; we have acquaintance in memory with things which have been data either of the outer senses or of the inner sense. Further, it is probable, though not certain, that we have acquaintance with Self, as that which is ... log in or subscribe to read full text