Blackwell Reference Online

Extract

Questions revolving around the concept of truth arise throughout philosophy. For example: is truth the proper target of scientific inquiry and hence a basic notion of epistemology? Should the meaning of a sentence be explained in terms of the circumstances that would render it true? Can ethical claims be true (or are they merely expressions of feeling)? Is one's preferred logic (e.g. classical, intuitionistic, quantum, etc.) to be justified on the basis of a preferred conception of truth? and how does the theory of truth bear on the various debates between realists and anti-realists? In order to answer these questions some understanding of the nature of truth would seem to be required, but the search for such understanding gives rise merely to further problems. For example: does the predicate, ‘is true’, express a property? If so, which one and what kinds of object possess it. and if not, what could the linguistic function of the truth predicate possibly be. Thus, although it will be readily accepted that statements typically specify their own condition for being true (for example, ‘snow is white’ is true if, and only if, snow is white), beyond such trivialities the characteristics and philosophical import of truth are shrouded in mystery and disagreement.To begin with, it is unclear to what kinds of entity the truth predicate should, strictly speaking, be applied. The prime candidates ... log in or subscribe to read full text