Full Text

bundle theory

james van cleve


Subject Philosophy » Metaphysics

DOI: 10.1111/b.9780631199991.1995.x


Extract

The view that an individual thing is nothing more than a bundle of properties. It is opposed to the view that an individual thing is a substance or substratum . Berkeley voices preference for a bundle theory over a substance theory (at least in the case of unthinking things) in the following passage: In this proposition ‘a die is hard, extended, and square,’ [some] will have it that the word ‘die’ denotes a subject or substance distinct from the hardness, extension, and figure which are predicated of it, and in which they exist. This I cannot comprehend; to me a die seems to be nothing distinct from those things which are termed its modes or accidents. ( Principles of Human Knowledge , para. 49) Bundle theories are often motivated by the fear that a substance would be (in Locke 's phrase) ‘something I know not what’, or worse yet, a bare something, devoid of features (see bare particular ). The fear is misplaced, however, since from the fact that a substance is something distinct from its properties, it does not follow that it does not have any properties; nor does it follow that its nature cannot be known. In the discussion that follows, it will be assumed that a bundle of properties is a set of properties, but what is said should hold equally well if a bundle is any other sort of complex entity (e.g. a whole) of which properties are the sole constituents. If a thing ... log in or subscribe to read full text

Log In

You are not currently logged-in to Blackwell Reference Online

If your institution has a subscription, you can log in here:

 

     Forgotten your password?

Find out how to subscribe.

Your library does not have access to this title. Please contact your librarian to arrange access.


[ access key 0 : accessibility information including access key list ] [ access key 1 : home page ] [ access key 2 : skip navigation ] [ access key 6 : help ] [ access key 9 : contact us ] [ access key 0 : accessibility statement ]

Blackwell Publishing Home Page

Blackwell Reference Online ® is a Blackwell Publishing Inc. registered trademark
Technology partner: Semantico Ltd.

Blackwell Publishing and its licensors hold the copyright in all material held in Blackwell Reference Online. No material may be resold or published elsewhere without Blackwell Publishing's written consent, save as authorised by a licence with Blackwell Publishing or to the extent required by the applicable law.

Back to Top