Full Text
intention
michael e. bratman
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There are two relevant aspects of intention’: (1) a characteristic of action, as when one acts intentionally or with a certain intention ; (2) a feature of one's mind, as when one intends (has an intention) to act in a certain way now or in the future. An important question is: how are (1) and (2) related? (See Anscombe, 1963 .)Some philosophers see acting with an intention as basic and as involving: (a)the action; (b) appropriate desires and beliefs; and (c) an appropriate explanatory relation between (a) and (b) ( Davidson, 1980 , essay 1). In explaining (a)in terms of (b) we give an explanation of the action in terms of the agent's reasons for so acting. What about intentions as states of mind? Some see them simply as complexes of desires and beliefs, some as evaluations ( Davidson, 1980 , essay 5), some as special kinds of beliefs ( Velleman, 1989 ), some as involving a special attitude of ‘willing’ ( Grice, 1971 ), and some as distinctive attitudes with important roles in practical reasoning ( Castañeda, 1975 : Harman, 1986 ) and planning ( Bratman, 1987 ). : Intention 2nd edn ( Ithaca , NY : Cornell University Press , 1963 ). : Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason ( Cambridge , MA : Harvard University Press , 1987 ). : Thinking and Doing ( Dordrecht : Reidel , 1975 ). : Essays on Actions and Events ( New York : Oxford University Press , 1980 ). ... log in or subscribe to read full text
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