Blackwell Reference Online

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An aspect – perhaps an (or the) essential aspect – of the mental: the directedness of mind as manifest through various states, activities or attitudes (not limited to the intending of actions or consequences), particularly in so far as such directedness admits of bi- or multivalence with respect to ontological status. Contemporary discussion has been influenced by Brentano's extension of the mediaeval notion of the intentional ‘inexistence’ of objects. Metaphysical issues concern the apparent fact that the object of intention may be imaginary, abstract, relatively indeterminate or even contradictory.Some construe intentionality relationally, there by apparently countenancing special entities or ontological categories on the side of the ‘object’: for example, non-existent objects. It is debated to what extent this is done by Brentano or Meinong (see the latter on the Ausserse in of ‘pure objects’ and on ‘incomplete objects’). Similar issues are raised regarding intentional relations with facts, propositions, states of affairs, or with what Meinong calls ‘objectives’. To avoid recourse to the latter, Russell proposed n-termed mental relations connecting subjects and the n - 1 constituents of such would-be objects. (See FACT; PROPOSITION/STATE OF AFFAIRS.)There are debates concerning the extent to which consciousness is fundamental for intentionality and also to which intentionality ... log in or subscribe to read full text