Blackwell Reference Online

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This essay deals with epistemological issues concerning perception. These can be briefly indicated by the question: “How, if at all, is perception a source of knowledge or justified belief?” To keep a discussion of a very complex subject matter within prescribed bounds, I will mostly focus on the “justified belief” side of the above disjunction, bringing in questions about perceptual knowledge only when dealing with a position that is specially concerned with knowledge. There are some other housekeeping moves to be made before we can get under way.(1) First a couple of points about epistemic justification. (a) Justification comes in degrees. I can be more or less justified in supposing that Yeltsin will resign the presidency, depending on the strength of my reasons for this. The epistemological literature mostly treats “justified” as an absolute term. Presumably this is because some minimal degree is being presupposed. I will follow this practice. (b) For most of our beliefs, including perceptual beliefs, what we typically identify as a justifier provides only defeasible, prima facie justification. Thus the way something looks to me prima facie justifies the belief that it is an elephant. That is, this belief will be justified, all things considered, provided there are no sufficient overriders of this prima facie justification, for example, strong reasons that there could not be ... log in or subscribe to read full text