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Once upon a time, modal logic was castigated because it ‘had no semantics.’ Kripke, Hintikka, Kanger, and others changed all that. In a similar way, when Relevant Logic was introduced by Anderson and Belnap, it too was castigated for ‘having no semantics.’ Then Routley and Meyer (1982a [1973]) changed all that, along with Urquhart (1992a [1972]), Fine (1992b [1974]), and others. The present overview marks a culmination of that effort. The semantic approach described here brings together a number of hitherto disparate efforts to set out formal systems for logics of relevant implication and entailment. It also makes clear (despite some of our hopes and utterances) that the One True Logic does not exist. This is as true for relevant logics as Kripke et al., showed it to be for modal logics. In both cases, subtle (and not so subtle) variations on semantical postulates produce different logics in the same family. The question of which semantical postulates are correct makes no sense without further context, i.e., the questioner needs to answer the question: Correct for what? The question that does remain is: What motivates the relevant family of logics? And this is the question that is the main job for this chapter to investigate. Entailment, one would think, is a relation. It is the relation that holds between the premises of a valid argument and its conclusion. Yet ... log in or subscribe to read full text