Blackwell Reference Online

Extract

Julius Caesar's two invasions of Britain, in 55 and 54 bc , enjoyed immense réclame in Rome at the time. This island beyond the stream of Ocean and little known to the general public, its very existence still doubted by some, was a place at the limits of the known world, a land fruitful in legends. But Britain had already presented itself in another guise to the expanding world of Rome, as a source of mineral wealth, a perennial attraction to Mediterranean powers. This did not provide the main reason for Caesar's interventions in Britain. Caesar's own account of his motives for his assault on the island is manifestly selective and inadequate ( Mitchell 1983 ). He was fully aware of the long-standing relationships between southern Britain and northern Gaul, which went back at least to the rule exercised by Diviciacus on both sides of the Channel in the earlier first century BC. He would also have known about trade connections between the continent and the island, which were not confined to the Channel narrows (see p. 2–5). He admitted to seeking intelligence from traders about the peoples of Britain, their institutions, warfare, and ports which might accommodate an invasion fleet, but claimed that he found little of use from this source. This is disingenuous, to put it mildly. Caesar's Gaulish informants could have told him much about the southern British tribes; traders would ... log in or subscribe to read full text