Blackwell Reference Online

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In the following, I want to suggest two different ways of understanding the relation between Kant's Critique of Judgment and the later German Idealist tradition. Commentators have long noted the point d'appui for any interpretation of this relation: Kant's remarks about an “intuitive intellect” (for him a divine, or creative intellect), and the interpretations of this doctrine offered by schelling (see Article 5) and hegel (Article 6). The first interpretation I want to consider might be called the received or standard view about that relation. I shall summarize it in sections I and II below. Roughly, according to this view, what Kant proposed as a mere regulative doctrine, of no central importance in the third Critique, was inflated by Schelling and Hegel, in a philosophically unjustifiable way, into a positive metaphysical claim about reality itself as a self-positing divine mind.The second view presents a different picture, and I shall begin defending it in the remaining sections. According to this second view, both the accounts of Kant and of Hegel in the standard view are wrong. Kant's views about the intuitive intellect are connected in a more positive and detailed way to the major claims about judgment made in the work as a whole (exactly as the Hegel of Glauben und Wissen claimed), and the position Hegel is beginning to defend, when basing his early formulations on these ... log in or subscribe to read full text