Blackwell Reference Online

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Can everything be reduced to the fundamental constituents of the world? Or can there be, and are there, non-reducible, or emergent entities, properties and laws? What exactly do we mean by “reduction” and “emergent” when we ask such questions? For example, if everything can be reduced to the fundamental constituents of the world, does that preclude the existence of emergent entities, properties or laws? Obviously, the answers to many of these questions depend on what is meant by the terms “reduction” and “emergence.” These terms are used in a variety of ways in the literature, none of which is uniquely privileged or uniform. Therefore, clarity is crucial to avoid confusion and equivocation. The first task of this chapter is to sort out and schematize the main versions of reduction and emergence, and then to turn to the current debates. The current state of the reductionism vs. emergentism debate is examined and the Final section looks toward future debate.Historically, there are two main construals of the problem of reduction and emergence: ontological and epistemological; see Stephan (1992), McLaughlin (1992) and Kim (1999) for historical background.• The ontological construal: is there some robust sense in which everything in the world can be said to be nothing but the fundamental constituents of reality (such as super-strings) or at the very least, determined by those constituents?• ... log in or subscribe to read full text