Full Text
Chapter 12. An Idealistic Realism: Presuppositional Realism and Justificatory Idealism
Nicholas Rescher
Subject
Philosophy
»
Metaphysics
Key-Topics
idealism, realism
DOI: 10.1111/b.9780631221210.2002.00013.x
Extract
Realism is the doctrine that things are generally mind-independent, that what exists generally does so in ways unaffected by what mind-endowed beings think about it. Idealism, by contrast, is the doctrine that the way things are is in general dependent upon what and how minds think about it. These two doctrines are usually viewed as diametrical opposites locked into a position of conflict that extends through virtually the whole of the history of philosophy.Often, however – and in metaphysics almost always – when discordant doctrines manage to maintain themselves over many generations – it transpires that there is really much to be said on all sides and that the most appropriate and tenable view of the matter is one that somehow manages to combine the best elements of both. Accordingly, the challenge that confronts the metaphysician in such cases is the shaping of a more complex doctrine that manages to effect a higher synthesis among the conflicting contentions by introducing whatever distinctions and sophistications are needed to achieve a reconciliation that accommodates the strong point of each rival position. The present discussion will endeavor to implement such a compromise.We humans are amphibians equipped with minds to function in the realm of thought and with bodies to operate in the natural world of space-time and causality. Accordingly, when philosophers talk of existence ... log in or subscribe to read full text
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