Blackwell Reference Online

Extract

‘Regarding the Gods, I have no means of knowing whether they exist or do not exist, or what they are like in form.’ The statement of Protagoras of Abdera (c. 490–420; 80 B 4 Diels-Kranz) has often been taken as emblematic of fifth-century sophistic rationalism, but it may be less revolutionary than it sounds. Greeks of the classical period had a tendency to believe that no certainty was possible with regard to the divine. Thus Herodotos, whose work is full of ‘god’, ‘gods' and ‘the divine’, remarks in connection with Egyptian religion that ‘all people know an equal amount about the divine’ (Hdt. 2.3.2) – by which he clearly means ‘equally little’. But Protagoras' words certainly point up a paradox at the heart of Greek religion. For ifthe Greeks in reflective mood believed that they knew little about the Gods, in other contexts they acted as though they knew a lot. They knew the names of the Gods, or at least some of them; they knew that Poseidon had to do with the sea, with earthquakes and with horses, and Demeter to do with land cultivation and cereal crops; they knew that Hera was the protector of Argos, and Athena of Athens; they knew that pigs should not be offered to Aphrodite, but that she was, on the other hand, rather fond of pigeons. And these were not simply odd facts that could be neatly sorted into a category ‘religion’; things to do with the Gods permeated pretty well ... log in or subscribe to read full text