Blackwell Reference Online

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The point of departure for all discussions of nonstatistical explanation in the philosophy of science has been the deductive-nomological or covering law model of explanation that was given its most influential exposition by Carl Hempel, who was also the pioneering figure in the discussion of statistical explanation (see statistical explanation). On this account, to explain a particular event, we cite other particular events together with a general law or laws which "cover" what we want to explain. For example, we might explain why a balloon expanded when placed on a radiator, by citing the fact that the radiator was hot together with the relevant laws relating heat to expansion.More precisely, on the deductive-nomological or D-N model, an explanation of an event is a valid deductive argument of the following form: C1, C2,…,Ck are statements describing various particular facts involved, the initial conditions; L1, L2,…,Lr are general laws; and the conclusion E is a statement describing the event to be explained. An argument of this form constitutes an explanation if and only if it is deductively valid, the statements describing the initial conditions are true, the statements L1, L2,…,Lr are true and express genuine laws, and enter essentially into the derivation.This model captures an important intuitive feature of explanation. We feel we understand why something happened if we ... log in or subscribe to read full text