Blackwell Reference Online

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Paul K. Feyerabend (1924–94) was an imaginative maverick philosopher of science, a critic of positivism, as well as, more recently, falsificationism, philosophy of science itself, and of “rationalist” attempts to lay down or discover rules of scientific method. In the 1950s, influenced by Karl Popper and Ludwig Wittgenstein, Feyerabend began a vigorous critique of logical empiricist philosophy of science, conducted through a study of observation and theory (see popper; logical empiricism; logical positivism ; and observation and theory ). He applied to the dispute over the interpretation of scientific theories (see theories ; also realism and instrumentalism ) a strong measure of Popperian conventionalism (see convention, role of ), arguing that this dispute is not a factual issue, but a matter of choice . We can choose to see theories either as descriptions of reality (scientific realism) or as instruments of prediction (instrumentalism), depending on what ideals of scientific knowledge we aspire to. These competing ideals (high factual content and sense certainty) are to be judged by their consequences. Stressing that philosophical theories have not merely reflected science but have changed it, Feyerabend held further that the form of our knowledge can be altered to fit our ideals. So we can have certainty, and theories that merely summarize experience, if we wish. But, ... log in or subscribe to read full text