Blackwell Reference Online

Extract

Each expression of a language surely means something – there is some fact as to what it means; but the nature of such facts is notoriously obscure and controversial. Consider the term “dog.” It possesses a distinctive literal meaning in English, and this feature is closely associated with various others, for example, that we use the word to help articulate certain thoughts; that it is appropriately translated into the Italian “cane” and the German “Hund”; and that we should try to apply it to dogs and only to dogs. But such characteristics range from the puzzling to the downright mysterious. Does thought itself take place in language? How might ‘little’ meanings (like that of “dog”) combine into ‘bigger’ ones (like that of “dogs bark”)? What is it about that word's meaning that enables it to reach out through space and time, and latch on to a particular hairy animal in ancient China? And there is a ramified profusion of further questions, as we shall see. So it isn't surprising that philosophy abounds with theories that aim to demystify these matters, to say what it is for a word or a sentence to have a meaning.The present review aims to map the terrain of alternative suggestions. To that end I will mention the central issues that must be confronted in developing an adequate account of meaning, the various positions that might be taken with respect to them, and some of the arguments ... log in or subscribe to read full text