Blackwell Reference Online

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is the claim that the moral evaluation of acts, dispositions, or any other possible object of moral assessment, is exclusively related to their contribution to an impartially good overall state of affairs. The continued appeal that such a conception of morality has for many of its adherents – even in the face of strenuous objections by critics – rests upon this fundamental idea. Somehow, it is thought, morality must have something essentially to do with how our acts, dispositions, etc., affect the world and make it either a better or worse place. A consequentialist perspective inherently captures this idea and makes it the ultimate basis of morality. This very general characterization covers a multitude of complexities, however, which call for some discussion. First of all, consequentialist theories can be differentiated, in part, by their reliance upon different conceptions of the good. The actual application of any consequentialist conception of ethics will necessarily presuppose some specified general conception of the good where this is defined independently of moral evaluation. Obviously, if the moral evaluation of our acts, dispositions, etc., depends on how these contribute to an impartially good state of affairs, to actually make such an evaluation, we must first have some conception of what is “good” or “valuable” that is independent of the moral evaluation itself. ... log in or subscribe to read full text