Blackwell Reference Online

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Broadly speaking, ethics has always been the study of What We Should Do. First, “we”: ethics has never been entirely self‐addressed, but rather is a general inquiry: the question is, what should one do, where “one” is anyone. It may also, however, be any one belonging to some identified group. Second, “should”: ethics is a “normative” inquiry. It is about what to do, what it would be good or bad, right or wrong, wise or unwise, to do. It is not merely an inquiry into what we actually do, into what makes us tick, the subject‐matter of (human) psychology, rather than ethics. Nevertheless, ethical theories always say something about “human nature,” in some way or other, as will be further noted below. And third, the word “do”: many ethical theories have concentrated on character, on what we should be like, rather than on the question of which actions we should perform. However, character is always presumed to have a bearing on action, to be borne out or exemplified in action. If it is separated from that practical interest, the study of character for its own sake would perhaps be found more nearly in aesthetics than ethics. However, there is a narrower use of the term “ethics,” one which applies to most of the moral philosophy of the past few centuries, though it is also applicable to much of the moral philosophy of earlier times as well. In this narrower use, ethics is concerned ... log in or subscribe to read full text