Blackwell Reference Online

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In the monopoly case against Microsoft Corporation ( see M icrosoft antitrust case ), Judge Jackson's decision concerning remedies for the illegal monopoly called for both structural and behavioral relief (see US v. Microsoft Corp ., 2000 ). It first called for splitting Microsoft into two firms, with one firm responsible for the Windows operating system and the other owning the Microsoft applications software (i.e., Microsoft Office, Internet Explorer, etc.). The rationale behind this split was the expectation that the first firm would continue to innovate in the operating system market, while the second firm would have incentive to make the applications functional for other operating systems, thus allowing new competitors to enter and compete in the operating system market where Microsoft currently holds a monopoly position. His decision also restricted Microsoft's conduct in several ways, including placing restrictions on Microsoft from making exclusive deals with Internet Service Providers (ISPs), and ending its anticompetitive restrictions on PC manufacturers. On appeal, the US Circuit Court concurred with the US Department of Justice's (DOJ) market definition and affirmed the lower court's findings of illegal exclusionary and predatory monopolistic practices (see US v. Microsoft Corp ., 2001 ). It overturned the proposed structural remedy, in part due to the severity ... log in or subscribe to read full text