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P hilosophy of mind, epistemology An argument introduced by the Australian philosopher Frank Jackson against the thesis of physicalism . Physicalism states that to know a mental state and event is to know the information about the relevant nervous system. A colorblind person, however, does not know what it is like to see a red thing until he is cured and can see the thing himself. The information about his brain remains unchanged, yet his qualia become different when he gains color vision. The same point can extend to other senses, such as tasting or hearing, and can apply to the sensations and experiences of a physically normal person in varying circumstances. This indicates that physicalism leaves something out. Certain sensations and perceptual experiences cannot be reduced to states of the brain because complete physical knowledge does not provide knowledge of qualia. “The polemical strength of the knowledge argument is that it is so hard to deny the central claim that one can have all the physical information without having all the information there is to have.” Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia,” Philosophical Quarterly 32 ... log in or subscribe to read full text