Blackwell Reference Online

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P hilosophy of mind An event that has mental properties , such as thinking, feeling, or willing. Either mental events exist independently or they have more fundamental physical properties. If a mental event causes some effect, must this causation be explained in terms of its physical properties, or is it because its mental properties themselves are causally potent? This question is related to the problem of the relationship between mental events and physical events, which is one of the central issues in the current debate of philosophy of mind. Davidson 's anomalous monism claims that while every mental event is a physical event, there are no strict psychophysical laws that connect the mental and physical realms. “Mental events (by which I mean events described in the mental vocabulary, whatever exactly that may be) are like many other sorts of events, and like material objects, in that we give their locations with no more accuracy than easy individuation (within the relevant vocabulary) demands.” Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events ... log in or subscribe to read full text