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non-cognitivism


Subject Philosophy

DOI: 10.1111/b.9781405106795.2004.x


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E thics Also called non-descriptivism, a type of meta-ethical theory that denies that we can have moral knowledge by intuition , and also denies that ethical statements can be construed as scientific statements , confirmable by observation or inductive reasoning. It claims that ethical terms do not refer to properties and that ethical judgments are neither true nor false and are not used to convey what is the case. Thus, it is opposed to the many traditional ethical theories that hold that there is ethical knowledge and that normative ethical judgments can be said to be true or false. These rival theories are therefore termed cognitivism and include both naturalist and non-naturalist varieties. The positive thesis of non-cognitivism is that in ethical thinking we should concentrate on the non-fact-stating functions of ethical expressions. Exactly what these functions are is an issue dividing many forms of non-cognitivism. For some, ethical expressions express attitude; for some, they issue commands; for some, they express exclamations; for some, they are prescriptions; and so on. The most influential non-cognitive theories are emotivism , developed by Stevenson , and prescriptivism , developed by Hare. “Noncognitivism: the job of ethical sentences is not to state facts.” Brandt, Ethical Theory ... log in or subscribe to read full text

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