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private particular

Subject Philosophy

DOI: 10.1111/b.9781405106795.2004.x


M etaphysics, philosophy of mind Strawson 's term covering sensations, mental events , or sense-data , in contrast to public or objective particulars. To identify private particulars in our common language we need to identify another class of particulars, that is, persons who have them. For instance, to identify a private impression of red one must assign the impression to the person who has it. Because of the dependence of their identification upon the identification of persons, Strawson denies that private particulars can be basic particulars , in contrast to the empiricist tradition of constructing persons and external objects from allegedly basic mental entities. “Identifying reference to ‘private particulars’ depends on identifying reference to particulars of another type altogether, namely persons.” Strawson, Individuals ... log in or subscribe to read full text

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