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propositional knowledge


Subject Philosophy

DOI: 10.1111/b.9781405106795.2004.x


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E pistemology Knowledge that something is the case, instances of which are expressed in the form S knows that p, where “S” stands for a person and “p” can be replaced by a proposition. As knowing-that or knowledge by description , propositional knowledge contrasts with knowledge by acquaintance (perceptual knowledge of a simple object), a priori knowledge, and knowing-how. The traditional or standard analysis of propositional knowledge is that it must satisfy three conditions: A knows p requires that (1) A believes that p, (2) p is true, and (3) A is justified in believing p. Historically, the majority of epistemological theories have analyzed each of these conditions and their interrelationships. Since Gettier posed his counterexamples to this definition , epistemologists have discussed whether we need to add a fourth condition to propositional knowledge and, if so, what it should be. “The general definition of propositional knowledge that I propose to defend is along traditional lines and can be expressed as follows: S knows that P if and only if (1) P, (2) S is confident that P, and (3) S's being so is supported by a disinterested justification for being so, (4) that is externally conclusive.” Ginet, Knowledge, Perception, Memory ... log in or subscribe to read full text

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