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conceptual relativism

Subject Philosophy

DOI: 10.1111/b.9781405106795.2004.x


M etaphysics, epistemology, ethics The claim that truth is relative to a conceptual scheme , and that there are different conceptual schemes in different cultures and traditions. Different people can and sometimes do adopt and use different specific notions of being true, being moral, and being right. Each of these different notions has its own rationality, and there is no common measurement among them. The position does not entail that the fact that one believes something automatically makes it true, but it advocates a pluralist attitude. “Conceptual relativism … apparently implies that conceptual variability admits of no rational assessment.” Moser, Philosophy after Objectivity ... log in or subscribe to read full text

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