Blackwell Reference Online

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L ogic, epistemology, philosophy of language Russell divided description into two kinds: indefinite description, that is, phrases of the form “a so-and-so,” and definite description, that is, phrases of the form “the so-and-so.” He claimed that descriptions are not referring expressions, and they do not need to denote anything in order to be meaningful. A description is an incomplete symbol and is meaningful only in a sentence that contains it (“contextual definition”). Both kinds of description can be analyzed away, and can be replaced by quantifiers and variables . We can replace an indefinite description with an existential quantifier (“There is one thing that is …) and we can replace a definite description with a uniqueness quantifier (“There is exactly one thing such that…). Russell's theory of definite descriptions has greatly influenced contemporary epistemology and logic, and has been cited as a model of philosophical analysis . The theory, however, is challenged by Peter Strawson , who argues that descriptions are, at least sometimes, referring expressions that can single out something. Keith Donnellan further argues that both Russell and Strawson are one-sided, for they fail to notice that description can be used either attributively or referentially. “Russell appears to claim for the Theory of Description that it gives an exact account of the working of one ... log in or subscribe to read full text