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But why all this creative reconstruction, all this make-believe?(“Epistemology Naturalized,” in Quine 1969: 75)We talk and act. That is already presupposed in everything that I am saying.(Wittgenstein 1983: part VI, section 17)My principal aim in this chapter is to consider the question of realism in Heidegger's Being and Time. (I also aim to say a few things about his views on truth, though, as we shall see, my remarks on that topic will serve as something of a coda to the discussion of realism.) The issue of whether or not Heidegger is a realist, and likewise whether or not he is an idealist, has been a matter of considerable debate in recent years, with serious interpreters offering a wide array of assessments. Heidegger has been read as committed, variously, to temporal, ontological, and linguistic idealism, as well as ontical, empirical, deflationary, and even multiple hermeneutic realism. In some cases, these labels have been mixed and matched, so that Heidegger comes out as, say, both an empirical realist, and an ontological or temporal idealist. Sorting through the merits and shortcomings of these various readings one by one would be an arduous undertaking which would far exceed the confines of this chapter. Accordingly, though I will at various points engage with a number of the readings already on offer (especially ones depicting Heidegger as ultimately an idealist), I ... log in or subscribe to read full text