Blackwell Reference Online

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David Hume is almost universally placed in the canon of major moral philosophers, yet disagreement persists regarding even the fundamentals of his theory. The titles and arguments in his Treatise (T) and second Enquiry (EPM) concentrate on virtue and vice, and EPM is said by Hume to be primarily a book about personal merit and virtue (EPM 1.10). Beyond these elementary facts, Hume's moral theory has engendered numerous competing interpretations.Several commentators have asserted that the theory is not normative (Glathe 1950: 99, 153; Kemp 1970: 51–2; Penelhum 1975: 131; Mackie 1980: 5–6; Fogelin 1985: 139–45; Hampton 1995: 66ff.; Schneewind 1998: 361). Although most commentators ignore this question, I regard it as pivotal: On the one hand, Hume's arguments spread into the normative territory of the justification and correction of moral beliefs. On the other hand, Hume never explicitly states that he defends a normative theory and at times seems intentionally to back away from the task.One fortunate point of scholarly agreement on these issues is that Hume's theory of morals must be rendered consistent with his project of an experimental science of human nature. Some commentators hold that Hume is a naturalist who maps and explains reason, passion, instinct, moral sentiment, and that any apparent normativity can be reduced to this naturalistic framework. This interpretation of Hume's ... log in or subscribe to read full text