Blackwell Reference Online

Extract

Realism has two indispensable and inseparable components: the one existential and ontological, the other cognitive and epistemic. The former maintains that there indeed is a real world: a realm of concrete, mind-independent, objective reality. The latter maintains that we can to some extent secure adequate descriptive information about this mind-independent realm, and that we can validate plausible claims about some of the specifics of its constitution. This second contention obviously presupposes the first, seeing that behind the question “Are our claims about an item correct?” there unavoidably stands the question “Is there indeed such an item for our claims to be about?” But how can that pivotal, ontological thesis of metaphysical realism be secured within a generally pragmatic approach? How can functional considerations of use and purpose come to have a relevant, let alone formative, bearing on theoretical matters of correctness, truth, and fact?The answer lies in the consideration that metaphysical realism represents a commitment that we presuppose for our inquiries rather than discover as a result of them. For we do not, and cannot, discover as a result of (mind-managed!) inquiry and investigation that a totally mind-detached reality actually exists. This is clearly not an inductive inference issuing from the scientific systematization of our observations, but rather represents ... log in or subscribe to read full text