Blackwell Reference Online

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Descartes made one of philosophy's best-known claims: ego cogito, ergo sum; “I think, therefore I am” (1:195; AT 8A:7). He thought that “anyone who philosophizes in an orderly way” would have to grasp this truth as “the first and most certain” (ibid.). He went on to argue that the “I” whose existence is discovered through the cogito is best thought of as a thing that thinks. In the Second Meditation, he explained what such a thing is. It is “certainly a thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling” (2:19; AT 7:28); Descartes thinks a meditator will find it fairly easy to see that these are so many different ways of thinking and that he can ascribe them to himself with certainty. It is more difficult for the meditator to come to see that a thinking thing is also “one that imagines and senses,” but he finds that, conceived properly, his imaginings and sensings are also thoughts that he can ascribe to himself with certainty (ibid.). When Descartes's meditator recognizes what he knows about himself, and the certainty with which he knows it, he remarks, “I know plainly that I can achieve an easier and more evident perception of my own mind than of anything else” (2:23; AT 7:34). In subsequent meditations, he argued that by starting with his understanding of himself, he can go on to acquire knowledge of God, mathematical truths, and truths about the existence ... log in or subscribe to read full text