Blackwell Reference Online

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It is widely assumed that Descartes's philosophy of mind is organized around three major commitments. The first is to substance dualism. The second is to individualism about mental content. The third is to a particularly strong form of the doctrine of privileged first-person access. Each of these commitments has been questioned by contemporary philosophers of mind. Substance dualism is generally regarded as a non-starter, individualism has come under attack from a number of different quarters, and the doctrine of privileged access has been watered down or rejected. Yet, at least as far as questions about mental content and privileged access are concerned, contemporary discussions still address what they represent as Descartes's views. More often than not crude parodies of these views end up as the focus of discussion, but more careful critics are usually prepared to recognize that Descartes's philosophy of mind is more subtle and nuanced than the parodies might lead one to suppose.Responses to substance dualism, the view that mind and body are distinct substances one of which (body) is material and the other (mind) immaterial, fall into two main categories. There are those which question its coherence and those which reject it on empirical grounds. It remains to be seen which form of objection is more appropriate, but it is worth noting that some critics of substance dualism have ... log in or subscribe to read full text