Blackwell Reference Online

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As moral agents, we have obligations toward one another. These obligations include acting with respect for one another's basic moral rights to life, liberty, and freedom from the unjustified infliction of harm. Most of us believe that infants and mentally disabled persons also have these basic rights, even though they may not (now) be moral agents. There is much more disagreement about whether human zygotes, embryos, and fetuses ought to have the same basic rights. And there is even more uncertainty about the moral status of animals, plants, species, and ecosystems. Do our moral obligations begin and end at the boundary of our own species? If not, how far do they extend?Some of the most pressing moral issues of our time turn in part upon the answers to these questions about moral status. I begin with a definition of moral status. Next, I discuss six theories, each of which purports to identify a single necessary and sufficient condition for the possession of full moral status. I argue that none of these uni-criterial theories captures all of the considerations that are relevant to what we owe to human beings, animals, plants, plant and animal species, and ecosystems. In my view, an entity's moral status can only be determined by considering a combination of certain of its intrinsic properties and certain of its relational properties. Finally, I consider the implications of this ... log in or subscribe to read full text