Blackwell Reference Online

Extract

In 1973 Richard Routley introduced a science-fiction example that has become foundational in discussions of environmental ethics. Roughly, what Routley asked us to consider was a man who knows that he is the last conscious being who will ever experience our planet. No one in the future will be able to appreciate Earth's mountain, canyons, forests, and deserts. For whatever reason, this “last man” conceives a desire to destroy these natural features. Would he be wrong to act on this desire? Writing in the 1980s Holmes Rolston III discussed a similar case in which radioactive fall-out sterilizes humans and mammals, but is harmless to the flora, invertebrates, reptiles, and birds. Rolston announces that it would be wrong for the “last race of valuers” to destroy the remaining biosphere “for it would be better for this much ecosystem to continue, even if the principal valuers are taken out” ( Rolston, 1986 : 114). Many environmentalists would agree with Rolston. It is the job of environmentalists to speak on behalf of the canyons, the ecosystems, and the forests ( Stone, 1974 ). Environmentalists value these features of nature because they are valuable; it is not the case that these features are valuable because environmentalists value them. Only by supposing that the values in nature are mind-independent can we account for the urgency of our views about protecting nature, for values ... log in or subscribe to read full text