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A way of thinking about the concept of epistemic justification in terms of epistemic duty. There are deontological and non-deontological approaches to characterizing epistemic justification. We can distinguish between them by considering the following question: The Epistemic Deontologism Question When a person considers a proposition, is it ever true that she epistemically ought to believe the proposition, disbelieve the proposition, or suspend judgment on the truth-value of the proposition? Some philosophers think that the answer to this question is “yes”. These philosophers take a deontological approach towards epistemic justification. Philosophers who think the answer is “no” take a non-deontological approach to epistemic justification. There are many different versions of epistemic deontologism, all of which have in common the claim that doxastic attitudes can be properly evaluated using deontological concepts. For example, some deontologists understand “S is justified in believing p ” as “S ought to believe p ”. Others would analyze it using locutions such as the following: “It is permissible for S to believe p ,” “S is not blameworthy in believing p ,” or “S is not irresponsible in believing p ”. In modern philosophy, René Descartes and John Locke are important advocates of epistemic deontologism. In his fourth Meditation, Descartes claimed: But if I abstain from ... log in or subscribe to read full text