Blackwell Reference Online

Extract

The thesis that, necessarily, whenever something has an epistemic property, E, it has a collection of non-epistemic properties, possession of which entails that it has E. Epistemic properties include justification , rationality , reasonableness , warrant , and knowledge . Non-epistemic properties include truth , falsity , reliably produced , and psychologically certain . Epistemologists tend to agree that an acceptable epistemological theory must respect the supervenience of epistemic on non-epistemic properties. The supervenience thesis can be understood ontologically , in which case it pertains to properties (or truths or facts ), or linguistically , in which case it applies to ascriptions . Those inclined to anti-realism about epistemic properties will favor the latter ( Klagge, 1988 ). Epistemologists, generally disinclined to anti-realism about epistemic properties, focus on the former. Supervenience is a relation between classes of properties (or truths, or facts). The A-properties supervene on the B-properties (the “subvenient” or “base” properties) just in case no two things can differ in their A-properties without also differing in some of their B-properties. In short: (S) There cannot be an A-difference without a B-difference. Supervenience theses vary with respect to what they quantify over. Individual super-venience theses quantify over individuals, ... log in or subscribe to read full text