Blackwell Reference Online

Extract

Initially the connection between the formal notation of symbolic logic and ordinary sentences of natural language might seem opaque. Why on earth would anyone want to draw a parallel between the technical and abstract endeavors of formal logicians and what seems more properly an object of study for linguists? However, it has been a common assumption of twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophy that symbolic logic can reveal something important about language. The reasons for this assumption are, in actual fact, not very hard to see. Arguments (1) and (2) are deductively valid inasmuch as it is impossible for their premises (their first two sentences) to be true and their conclusions (their last sentence) false: (1) If the Yankees won, then there will be a parade. The Yankees won. So, there will be a parade. (2) If Socrates is a man, then he is mortal. Socrates is a man. So, he is mortal. Moreover, the reason that (1) is valid does not seem to be independent of the reason that (2) is: both seem valid because they share a common form. Each begins with a conditional statement, followed by another premise that asserts the condition part (the antecedent ) of the first premise, and concludes with its consequent part. By virtue of sharing this form, both arguments (and countless others) are not only valid but are valid in virtue of this shared form . Though (1) is about the Yankees ... log in or subscribe to read full text