Full Text
Chapter Fifty-two. Military Justice
Mark Weitz
Subject
History
»
Legal History, Military History
Study of History
»
Historiography
Place
Northern America
»
United States of America
Period
1000 - 1999
»
1900-1999
Key-Topics
war
DOI: 10.1111/b.9781405161497.2010.00054.x
Extract
The need to control troops has existed from the inception of organized armies. Over the centuries the necessity of maintaining order in the ranks, whether on land or at sea, has taken precedence over insuring that discipline was meted out fairly. US Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black (1955) conceded this subordination of fairness to the need for military discipline in Toth v. Quarles (1955) when he wrote:Unlike courts, it is the primary business of armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise. But trial of soldiers to maintain discipline is merely incidental to an army's primary fighting function.Civil courts recognized this harsh reality long before Black restated it and have rarely intervened in the military justice system (Henderson 1957, Wiener 1958).Military justice, the process and structure by which military discipline is maintained is not only a distinct aspect of the armed forces, but for most of military history has been far from just, reflecting an emphasis on rigid, summary disposition of punishment. The history of military justice then is the development and evolution of rules, regulations, and processes that facilitate the exercise of discipline, and over time has sought to afford some protection for soldiers within a system that has always viewed their rights as subordinate to the need to maintain absolute obedience to authority. From ... log in or subscribe to read full text
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