Blackwell Reference Online

Extract

There is consensus in psychology and cognitive science that the capacity to recognize a behavior as intentional is a central component of human social cognition; that this capacity has evolved for its adaptive value in social interaction; and that it develops rather rapidly in the early years of childhood ( Malle et al. 2001 ; Zelazo et al. 1999 ). We also know that adults judge intentionality fast and with ease and that these judgments both regulate attention in social interaction and guide explanations and evaluations of behavior ( Malle 2004 ). But exactly how do people conceptualize intentional action and how do they judge a given behavior as intentional? People share a powerful folk concept of intentionality that is acquired by interacting with other people in human culture. At least some folk concepts are historically and cross-culturally stable, and the evidence suggests that intentionality is one of them ( Malle 2008 ). Furthermore, the concept of intentionality is part of folk psychology – the larger conceptual and cognitive apparatus that allows people to make sense of human behavior in terms of mental states. In fact, intentionality may be the core concept of folk psychology, as it connects behavior directly with the mind, by classifying a behavior as intentional when it is characteristically caused by certain mental processes and states (such as belief, intention, and ... log in or subscribe to read full text