Blackwell Reference Online

Extract

Comment on this article   Existing scholarship on intelligence producer-consumer relations is strikingly atheoretical. Much of the literature is contained in histories and memoirs, where retired intelligence officials offer professional impressions as well as advice for their successors. There is wide recognition of the inherent difficulties involved in maintaining productive relations, but prescriptions are often nothing more than exhortations for better behavior: Producers should be more willing to accept criticism and more responsive to policy requests, and consumers should be more open-minded. Compared to the research on civil-military relations, where scholars have developed an impressive stock of theory on the requirements for effective civilian control, the literature on intelligence and policy is inchoate and episodic. Controversies usually arise in the wake of surprise attacks and other apparent intelligence failures. It is no accident that the major bursts of theoretical inquiry have occurred in the aftermath of investigations into the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Egyptian-Syrian attack on Israel in 1973, the sudden fall of the Soviet Union, and the September 11 attacks. The pattern in these cases is familiar: Critics complain that intelligence fails to provide adequate warning, and intelligence officials complain that their warnings go unheeded by distracted or stubborn ... log in or subscribe to read full text